Mr. President, as I just

noted, there are actually two parts of

this legislation. One of them has to do

with the implementation of the chemical

weapons treaty which was ratified

in the Senate last year.

The legislation passed about a year

ago. It was finally dealt with by the

House, and comes back to us. I do not

know of any objection to it. And I will

not take the time to summarize it except

to say that in general terms it

makes it a crime for Americans to

produce or use or manufacture these

chemical weapons.

It provides protections for American

citizens and businesses in terms of

search and seizure and takings, so that

with respect to the inspection regime

that is established under the treaty,

there is protection of American citizens’

constitutional rights, and if anyone

has a question about that legislation,

I am prepared to try to answer

that today.

But by far and away the issue that is

before us today of most interest to

Members is, of course, the Russian missile

assistance to Iran. The majority

leader spoke eloquently on the patience

that the Senate has exercised in

withholding action on this important

legislation until this time.

But there does come a time when, as

the majority leader said, the Senate

does have to finally act here. We believe

that by passing this legislation, it

will actually have a positive impact on

the leadership of Russia which has had

a very difficult time ensuring that the

assistance provided to Iran is stopped.

Now, one might say, ‘‘Well, that

doesn’t make a lot of sense if it is the

policy of the Russian Government that

this assistance not be transferred to

Iran.’’ But the fact of the matter is, it

is difficult for the Russian Government,

as the majority leader said, to

ensure that there is no transfer of technology

or material to the Iranian missile

program.

When confronted with evidence that

this has occurred, in some cases the

Russian Government appears to have

tried to take action against it; in other

cases, as the majority leader said, that

has not happened. So this legislation

should provide a basis not only for the

United States to specifically direct attention

to the matter, but also for the

Russian Government to have a very

specific basis for enforcing its laws and

policies against the providing of such

technology to Iran.

Mr. President, let me just outline in

very brief terms some of the open source

information about the kind of

technology and other assistance that

has been provided by Russian firms, individuals,

and other entities to the Iranian

program.

One of the Russian ICBM missiles—or

at least intermediate-range missile—is

called an SS–4 in our terminology. And

important missile components and instructions

of how to build that missile

have been sent to the Iranians.

This is important because this missile

has a much greater capability than

the one that is most likely to be produced

soon. This missile, in the Iranian

term, is called the Shahab-4. It would

have the capability of reaching cities

in Europe, Mr. President. So it is not

just a regional weapon, but a weapon

that will challenge countries in Europe

as well as in the Middle East. That

weapon, according to open-source material,

could be deployable within as

little as 3 years.

In addition to that, construction of a

wind tunnel for missile design and

manufacture of missile models, and

even the sale of missile design software

has occurred.

Moreover, missile guidance and propulsion

components, as well as the necessary

advice and equipment to

produce these components in Iran has

been provided. In that sense, Mr. President,

let me note that it is not Russians

who are actually building these

missiles for the Iranians, it is Russians

who are providing much of the material

and the assistance and the technology

for the Iranians to do it themselves.

So they will have an indigenous

capability.

In addition, more than one special

metal alloy which Iran can shape into

missile casings and even alloy foil in

thin sheets used to shield guidance

equipment had been provided, in one

case, according to open-source material,

was stopped in another country

after it left Russia.

Training of Iranian technicians at

Russian institutes and the recruitment

of top Russian missile specialists to

work with Iran has all occurred within

the most recent months or years.

As I said, the Iranians are using this

technology to produce two missiles:

One we call the Shahab-3, the other the

Shahab-4. The Shahab-3 has a 1,300-kilometer

range roughly, depending upon

what kind of warhead is included on it,

and is capable of targeting Israel, as

well as other targets in the Middle

East. According to open-source material,

development of this missile could

be completed in 12 to 18 months.

I mentioned the Shahab-4, which is

capable of reaching Central Europe,

and the fact that development could be

completed in 3 years.

Mr. President, since the Senator

from Connecticut, I think, is preparing

to speak, let me just summarize one

other aspect of this assistance; that is

the Russian nuclear assistance to Iran,

not specifically the target of this legislation,

but of equal concern to us.

Russia has assisted Iran in a number

of ways, including a contract to construct

a nuclear reactor and a deal to

provide nuclear fuel for the reactor for

20 years, and to take back spent fuel

for reprocessing. It has agreed to train

Iranian nuclear technicians to operate

the plant, to construct three additional

reactors when the first contract is

complete.

In 1995, in response to U.S. pressure,

Russia agreed to limit the scope of nuclear

cooperation with Iran and canceled

plans to sell gas centrifuge enrichment

technology, and heavy water

moderated reactors.

However, Russia has exceeded the

limits it agreed to place on its nuclear

cooperation with Iran. According to an

article in July 1997 by The Washington

Post, the United States intelligence reports

‘‘document[ed] a series of high level

technical exchanges between Russia

and Iranian engineers,’’ which covered

matters beyond the Bushehr reactor,

including advice on how to mine

and process uranium.

Finally, Mr. President, just this

month, The Washington Times disclosed

that U.S. intelligence reports indicate

that Iranian nuclear officials

were negotiating to purchase tritium

from Russia and were slated to view a

demonstration of gas centrifuge technology

used to enrich uranium for nuclear

weapons during a visit to Moscow

later this month.

At a meeting just last week, we specifically

asked the Russian Ambassador

if he would try to see to it that

that demonstration project was not

held because its only purpose is to assist

the uranium nuclear program. He

indicated personally a desire not to see

that meeting go forward, but we will

see whether it does.

Tritium, which I mentioned, is, of

course, important for the boosting of

nuclear weapons and would be an important

way for the Iranians to make a

nuclear technology more robust than it

might be otherwise. These are serious

matters.

The Russian Government, whether

complicity or simply negligence, has

not been able to stop the transfer of

these materials and this technology.

The United States cannot simply sit by

and hope for diplomatic actions to

work. In the Senate and the House, we

recently passed money for a supplemental

appropriations bill which will

be applied to both Israeli theater missile

defense systems and the U.S. theater

missile defense systems so we may

at an earlier day be able to meet the

threat that the Iranian missiles might

pose.

There may be a window of vulnerability.

That is why it is important for

us to try to slow down and stop the assistance

that Russia is providing to

Iran. This is very important legislation.

I hope our colleagues will support

it strongly, sending a strong signal to

Russia that it should not be providing

or allowing to be provided this important

technology to Iran.

I yield whatever time the Senator

from Connecticut desires.